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In re:  GREEN FIELD ENERGY SERVICES, INC,  
A/K/A Green Field Energy Services, LLC, 








MICHAEL B. MORENO; MOR MGH HOLDINGS, LLC; MOODY, MORENO, 
AND RUCKS; SHALE SUPPORT SERVICES, LLC; DYNAMIC INDUSTRIES, INC.; 
DYNAMIC GROUP HOLDINGS, LLC; MORENO PROPERTIES, LLC; ELLE 
INVESTMENTS, LLC; LQT INDUSTRIES, LLC, A/K/A Dynamic Energy Services 
International, LLC; ENRIQUE FONTAVA; CHARLIE KILGORE; MARK KNIGHT 
 
          MICHAEL MORENO; MOR MGH HOLDINGS, LLC, 
                                                                                        Appellants 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. No. 1-18-cv-01881) 
District Judge: Honorable Colm F. Connolly 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
October 2, 2020 
 
Before:  SHWARTZ, PHIPPS and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 











FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
This appeal arises out of an adversary proceeding in Bankruptcy Court. Following 
a bench trial, the Bankruptcy Court found appellant Michel B. Moreno personally liable 
for tortious interference with contract and recommended imposition of a constructive 
trust over his Dallas, Texas residence. On review, the District Court agreed. It entered 
final judgment on liability and imposed the constructive trust. Moreno and co-appellant 
MOR MGH Holdings, LLC challenge both rulings on multiple grounds. We will affirm.1 
The District Court held that Moreno tortiously interfered by causing MOR MGH, 
a shell entity he controlled, to breach its contracts to buy stock in another of Moreno’s 
companies, Green Field Energy Services, Inc. Under applicable New York law, “[t]he 
elements of a tortious interference with contract claim are well established—the existence 
of a valid contract, the tortfeasor’s knowledge of the contract and intentional interference 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(c)(1), 1334(b). We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s findings of fact 
for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Copelin v. Spirco, Inc., 182 F.3d 174, 




with it, the resulting breach and damages.”2 Normally, an officer of a corporation is not 
liable for tortious interference merely because he or she makes decisions that lead the 
corporation to a contractual breach.3 Rather, liability attaches where the officer acts for 
“personal gain, as distinguished from gain for the corporation.”4 The District Court held 
that Moreno tortiously interfered because he knew that MOR MGH, lacking any assets of 
its own, would be unable to meet its obligations unless Moreno provided the money, 
which he declined to do. The Court concluded that personal gain drove this decision, 
because Moreno spent $10 million of a loan from Goldman Sachs—money that would 
have enabled MOR MGH to buy the necessary stock—to purchase his home in Dallas. 
Moreno offers a variety of arguments for why the District Court erred. First, he 
says, the Court presumed that he was required to use his personal wealth to enable MOR 
MGH to meet its contractual obligations to Green Field. Contrary to this assertion, the 
District Court never presumed an independent legal obligation requiring Moreno to 
finance MOR MGH. Rather, it concluded that his decision to cease such financing 
qualified as tortious interference, because Moreno knew that MOR MGH could not 
otherwise perform. 
 
2 Hoag v. Chancellor, Inc., 677 N.Y.S.2d 531, 533 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). The 
Bankruptcy Court applied New York law based on a choice-of-law provision in the 
contracts. The District Court did the same, and the parties do not object. 
3 Rockland Exposition, Inc. v. All. of Auto. Serv. Providers of N.J., 894 F. Supp. 2d 
288, 337-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), as amended (Sept. 19, 2012). 





Next, Moreno contends that he never “chose to cause MOR MGH” to breach its 
contracts. Appellants’ Br. 21. The record demonstrates, however, that Moreno alone 
controlled whether MOR MGH made the necessary stock purchases, that he possessed 
the needed funds, and that he deliberately declined to provide them, preferring to 
prioritize a different business venture and his Dallas home purchase. 
Third, Moreno asserts that the District Court erred because it found him liable 
notwithstanding its finding that the $10 million from Goldman Sachs was never 
“earmarked for Green Field.” Appellants’ Br. 18. Although he now claims he was not 
permitted to use those borrowed funds on Green Field stock, Moreno himself testified 
that “[t]he loan had the ability for me to invest in Green Field,” and the record 
demonstrates the same. App. 1254. While Moreno is correct on earmarking, the law asks 
not whether the funds were earmarked, but whether he acted for “personal gain.”5 We 
agree with the District Court that Moreno acted for personal gain by (i) taking $10 
million in non-earmarked but nonetheless available funds, (ii) depriving MOR MGH of 
the ability make its promised $10 million stock purchase, and (iii) using those available 
funds to buy a home. 
Finally, Moreno argues that he was not responsible for Green Field’s financial 
woes and that he channeled millions of dollars into Green Field prior to its bankruptcy. 






Field suffered damages the moment Moreno caused MOR MGH to breach. The 
Bankruptcy Court so found, the District Court adopted that finding, and Moreno does not 
challenge it on appeal. Thus, Moreno fails to identify any error in the District Court’s 
ruling. 
Turning to the constructive trust, Moreno argues that the District Court erred by 
imposing this remedy without clear and convincing evidence. “When one party, by virtue 
of fraudulent, unfair or unconscionable conduct, is enriched at the expense of another to 
whom he or she owes some duty, a constructive trust will be imposed.”6 “To prevail on a 
claim for . . . imposition of a constructive trust[,] the Trustee must . . . show that ([i]) 
there was an enrichment; (ii) an impoverishment; (iii) a relation between the enrichment 
and the impoverishment; (iv) the absence of justification; and (v) the absence of a remedy 
provided by law.”7 
According to Moreno’s own testimony, in 2013 he caused MOR MGH to contract 
with Green Field to purchase $10 million of preferred stock. The contract referenced “a 
borrowing from Goldman Sachs.” App. 998. Moreno admitted that he used this money 
instead to purchase his Dallas home. Lastly, Moreno acknowledged that Green Field 
never received from MOR MGH what it was owed under the contract. This testimony, 
corroborated in the record, constitutes clear and convincing evidence of the five elements 
 
6 Hogg v. Walker, 622 A.2d 648, 652 (Del. 1993). The Bankruptcy Court applied 
Delaware law, the District Court agreed, and the parties do not object on appeal. 




necessary to impose a constructive trust.8 Although Moreno asserts that more evidence 
was required to “trac[e]” the Goldman loan directly to his home, he cites no legal 
authority establishing such a requirement. Appellants’ Br. 26. 
Next, Moreno cites a single, unpublished case to argue that the District Court’s 
finding on earmarking precludes the imposition of a constructive trust. That case is 
distinguishable, however, because it did not involve allegations of fraud or unfairness, 
but a good faith dispute over an annuity owner’s attempt to revise her beneficiary 
designation.9 Here, by contrast, the record evidences a lack of good faith: Moreno used 
the borrowed $10 million to buy a home, simultaneously deprived MOR MGH of the $10 
million it needed to perform its obligations, and then falsely certified that the $10 million 
stock purchase had in fact occurred. In our view, this constitutes unfair and 
unconscionable conduct.10 As for the other elements required for a constructive trust, the 
absence of earmarking is hardly decisive. The Goldman loan permitted multiple uses, but 
Moreno’s chosen use was unjustified and caused him to be enriched at Green Field’s 
expense. 
Moreno’s final three arguments against the constructive trust have been waived. 
He filed a brief developing these arguments in Bankruptcy Court. But he later withdrew 
 
8 See id. 
9 Pedrick v. Roten, No. 11-1221-SRF, 2013 WL 351667, *1-*5 (D. Del. Jan. 29, 
2013). 




that filing, which consequently was never transmitted to the District Court. Instead, what 
became Moreno’s opening brief in District Court contained only fleeting references to 
one of these three arguments.11 “To preserve a matter for appellate review, a party must 
unequivocally put its position before the [District C]ourt at a point and in a manner that 
permits the court to consider its merits.”12 Moreno failed to do this. Accordingly, the 
three arguments “raised in passing . . . , but not squarely argued” until Moreno’s reply 
brief in District Court “are considered waived.”13 
For these reasons, we will affirm. 
 
11 Moreno purported to “incorporate by reference the arguments presented” in his 
earlier filing, App. 2773, but as the District Court correctly noted, that filing was 
subsequently withdrawn. 
12 Garza v. Citigroup Inc., 881 F.3d 277, 284 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted); see also In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 
262 (3d Cir. 2009) (“A fleeting reference or vague allusion to an issue will not suffice to 
preserve it for appeal, so ‘the crucial question regarding waiver is whether [appellants] 
presented the argument with sufficient specificity to alert the [D]istrict [C]ourt.’” 
(quoting Keenan v. City of Phila., 983 F.2d 459, 471 (3d Cir. 1992))). 
13 John Wyeth & Bro. Ltd. v. Cigna Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n.6 (3d Cir. 
1997); see also Jaludi v. Citigroup, 933 F.3d 246, 256-57 n.11 (3d Cir. 2019) (“Because 
Citigroup failed to invoke the provision until its reply brief in the District Court, we deem 
this argument waived.”). 
